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Abstract
Individuals with disabilities face greater challenges in the labor market than able-bodied 
individuals and a growing body of research is finding that their children also tend to have more
developmental problems than the children of able-bodied parents. Can transfer payments help
reduce this gap? In this paper, we present the first evidence on how parental disability benefits 
affect the well-being of children. Using changes in real benefits under ten disability benefit 
programs in Canada as an identification strategy and Statistics Canada's National Longitudinal 
Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY) as the data source on child outcomes, we find strong 
evidence that higher benefits lead to improvements in children's cognitive and non-cognitive 
development, as measured by math scores in standardized tests, hyperactive symptoms and 
emotional anxiety behavior. The effect is larger on children with a disabled mother than on those 
with a disabled father.
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1. Introduction
In most Statistics Canada’s population surveys, disability is defined as being functionally limited in usual activities 
due to a health related problem or condition for more than six months. 1 Based on this definition, an estimated 2.4 
million working-age Canadians (11.5 % of total population) reported at least one disability in 2006 (Human Resources 
and Social Development Canada, 2009). Within this large population, many are parents of children under 15. Using
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), we estimate around 1.8 million
Canadian children aged under 15, about one in six, lived with at least one disabled parent at a point in time during 
1994-2006. Based on Census 2000 for the U.S. and a measure of more serious disabilities, Avery and Hogan (2006) 
report that about 13 % of non-disabled children aged 5-17 grow up in families with at least one disabled parent.
Parental disability thus is a considerable influence in the lives of many young and adolescent children. 2
The importance of parental investment to the healthy development of children has been noted by a large literature in 
economics. However, maintaining the optimal level of investment may be especially difficult for parents with 
disabilities. A growing body of research has found that children living with a disabled parent fare significantly worse 
than children of non-disabled parents in school enrollment (Mont and Cuong 2013; Bratti and Mendola 2014), 
educational attainment (Haveman and Wolfe 1995), and behavioral problems (Morefield 2010; Morefield, Mühlenweg 
and Westermaier, 2011). Importantly, the evidence is not only found in developing countries, but also within societies,
such as Germany, with well-developed social safety nets and substantial intergenerational mobility. 3
The policy question is whether more income, in particular, government transfers to poor parents with disabilities, can
help mediate the negative consequences of parental disability and improve children's well-being. The consensus of a
large literature studying implications of family income for child outcomes is that current income has a relatively small 
association with child outcomes (Currie 2008 and 2011; Currie and Stabile 2003; Dooley and Stewart 2004; Mayer 
1997; Mayer and Jencks 1993). However, the situation for children in families with disabled parents may be somewhat 
different.  First, the marginal value of income may be larger since families with disabled parents have both lower 
incomes and higher expenses (e.g., medical or potentially for domestic help, depending on the nature and severity of 
the condition). Also, the marginal value of time at home for the non-disabled parent may be higher, given that the non-
disabled parent will likely face a larger share of standard childcare and housework as well as potentially increase care 
required by the individual with the disability.
In this paper, we present the first evidence on how parental disability benefits can affect the development of young 
children. We draw data from Statistics Canada's National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), a 
nationally representative survey that provides intergenerational information on parents and children, including both 
parents' activity limitations. We focus on three outcomes that are commonly perceived as key elements of children's 
human capital: cognitive ability, behavioral problems and social/emotional well-being, as measured by math scores in 
1 For example, Statistics Canada’s Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) identifies persons with a 
disability by using two filter questions on the Census. The first question asks the respondents whether they have any 
difficulties in hearing, seeing, communicating, walking, climbing stairs, bending, learning or doing any similar 
activities. The second question asks whether there are any physical/mental conditions or health problems that reduce 
the amount or kind of activity the person can do at home, in leisure activities, at work, or at school. A yes to any of 
these questions will result in a respondent being selected into the PALS survey pool.
2 Documentation on the prevalence of parents with disabilities has been extremely scarce in the literature. A main 
reason may be data availability -- most national surveys provide information on the number of people with disabilities 
or the number of parents, but not the combination of these two characteristics (Preston 2012).
3 For example, Mont and Cuong (2013) find in the 2006 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey that children 
of parents with a disability have a lower enrollment rate in primary and secondary school. Bratti and Mendola (2014)
presents evidence from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) that 
children of mothers with severe limitations in activity of daily living are less likely to be in school at ages 15-24. 
Morefield, Mühlenweg and Westermaier (2011) find from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) that work-
limiting disabilities of either parent significantly increase children’s problem behaviours and negatively affect their 
personality traits.
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standardized tests, parent-report hyperactive symptoms and emotional anxiety behavior, all of which have been shown 
to have lasting implications for children's educational attainment and eventual labour market success (Cameron and 
Heckman 1998; Cunha, Heckman and Schennach 2010; Currie and Almond 2011).
In Canada, needs-tested disability benefits are provided by provincial governments. In administering their own 
programs, each province has the flexibility of setting up its own rules and benefit levels, resulting in considerable 
variation in benefit generosity both across provinces and over time. For example, as shown in Table 1, in 1994 Ontario 
(at $15,338) had substantially higher benefits than Quebec (at $10,468). Subsequently, Ontario cut its benefits 
substantially (by 19 % during our observation period) while Quebec kept its rates roughly constant. In 2000, New 
Brunswick offered even less than Quebec ($8,337) while an individual with the same disabling condition in Ontario 
was entitled to $14,101. 4
In this study, we consider these changes in real benefits under ten disability benefit programs to be a source of 
exogenous variation, and use a continuous difference-in-differences (DD) approach to investigate the effect of parental 
disability benefits on child's development assuming that the child’s province of residence, hence exposure to variation 
in benefit levels is independent of the unobservable determinants of the child’s outcomes. Because unmeasured within-
province shocks may influence all children’s outcomes,5 we use children of non-disabled parents who live in the same 
province as comparison group and test whether changes in the outcomes gap between children with disabled and non-
disabled parents correspond to the changes in benefits within provinces over time. Since social assistance benefits are 
only relevant for lower-income households, our main analysis restricts the sample to children whose both parents have 
low education.
If the benefit claim, benefit duration or the incidence of self-reported disability is influenced by the generosity of 
benefits, or if there is an inter-provincial migration response to benefit changes, then our identifying assumption may, 
in principle, be violated. The richness of the NLSCY allows us to address these sources of bias by constructing a 
longitudinal sample that tracks each child over time.
In every province, there is an achievement gap between the children of disabled and non-disabled parents, but we find 
that the gap is smaller when disability benefits are higher. Overall, we conclude that higher parental disability benefits 
lead to a substantial reduction in the gap in cognitive and non-cognitive skill development between children of disabled 
and non-disabled parents. We know of no plausible argument why greater benefits paid to disabled parents should 
diminish achievement among the children of non-disabled parents – hence our interpretation is that the gap narrows 
because the achievement of children of disabled parents is improved. The intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates of this 
paper suggest that children with disabled parents living in a province that cut its real annual disability benefits by 
$3,000, as Ontario did during 1994--2008, would experience a decrease of 3 % of one standard deviation in cognitive 
ability as measured by standardized math test scores and 10-11 % of one standard deviation increase in behavior 
problems and emotional anxiety. According to a crude extrapolation based on available data, we assess the magnitude 
of the treatment effect (i.e. the average treatment on the treated) to be 6-7 times as large as the ITT effect found in this 
paper.
We find different benefit effects depending on the gender of the disabled parent: lower benefits result in a significant 
detrimental effect for children with a disabled mother but not for children with a disabled father. All things being 
equal, a $1,000 benefit reduction leads to a 2 % of a standard deviation reduction in math test scores, and a 6 % and 
4 % standard deviation increase in behavior problems and emotional anxiety for children who have a disabled mother. 
Our preliminary analysis on mechanisms suggests one channel through which lower benefits may hurt children is the 
non-disabled spouse's time inputs – when the mother is disabled, her effective time devoted to childcare can be low, 
so fathers’ time spent with children may be particularly important. Our finding is also consistent with the “good mother 
hypothesis” (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Woolley 2004) that a mother’s income 
is more likely than a father’s income to be spent in ways that benefit the children.
4 All dollar values expressed in 2008 dollars.
5 For example, Milligan and Stabile (2011) using data from the Canadian NLSCY conclude that the provincial child 
tax benefit policies initiated in 1998 have a significant positive effect on educational outcomes, physical health and 
mental health for the general population of children.
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal
of Population Economics, published by Springer.  Copyright restrictions may apply.  doi:  10.1007/s00148-015-0557-9
3
Numerous researchers have examined the labor market disincentive effects of disability benefit programs (e.g. Bound 
and Burkhauser 1999; Haveman and Wolfe 2000; Campolieti 2004; Campolieti, Gomez and Gunderson, 2009), our
study is the first to investigate the implication of disability benefits for the development and well-being of children.
Our study also differs from many existing studies on welfare and child development by focusing on a vulnerable group 
of children who have thus far been largely ignored by economists (i.e. children with a disabled parent), and by 
including not only indicators of cognitive skills (i.e. math test scores), but also non-cognitive skills (i.e. children's 
problem behaviour and emotional well-being). Finally, our family income and parental employment analysis 
contributes to a broader economics literature on the labour supply effects of disability benefits. Our estimates of 
disability benefit effects on weekly hours of work fall roughly within the range of previously published estimates 
using Canadian data, and are consistent with the “missing added worker” effects found by other studies in North 
America (e.g. Colie 2004; Gallipoli and Turner 2009).
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature and discusses some conceptual 
issues to guide the subsequent empirical analysis; Section 3 introduces provincial disability benefit programs; Section 
4 and 5 describe our empirical strategy and datasets. Sections 6 and 7 present the results and conclude, respectively.
2. Parental Money, Time and Children’s Well-Being
Despite strong evidence that living with a disabled parent significantly impairs the development of children, very little 
is known about the extent to which increased parental income can improve the outcomes. In fact, there has been a
long-standing debate in the economics literature over the nature, as well as the size of the relationship between parental
income and the well-being of children (see a comprehensive review by Mayer 1997). In theory, the economic models 
that originate from Becker and Tomes (1986) clearly make the case that children's well-being depends upon investment 
decisions made by their parents. How much parents invest in their children is constrained by their ability to finance 
investment – i.e. by their income and access to capital. Yet many studies find small and sometimes even statistically 
insignificant associations, depending on the measure of income and the component of children's well-being studied.
A number of recent studies suggest that the economic resources of parents can be multi-dimensional in nature, and 
annual money income flows alone may not capture all channels through which a parent's deprivation and/or poverty 
status can hurt children. For example, using housing as a proxy for family assets and data from the Statistics Canada's 
NLSCY, Curtis and Phipps (2000) find that after controlling for current and/or long-run average family income, 
children who live in owner-occupied housing have better outcomes than children who do not, and children who live 
in housing in need of major repairs have worse outcomes. Their research also indicates that holding income constant, 
more hours of parental time available each week 6 significantly improves a child's success at school. Using the U.S. 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Ruhm (2004) finds that conditional on income levels, maternal 
employment, as measured by weekly work hours, during the first years of the child's life has a large deleterious impact 
on the math and reading performance of young children. If true, the policy implication of these findings is that, besides 
the income transfer itself, government income transfer programs may have an additional relationship with child well-
being if they assist families with children to accumulate assets such as housing, or if they increase parental time spent 
with children.
The impact of government income transfers on children can be further complicated by the design of a transfer program.
The evidence from existing literature on the effect of various welfare programs on children in general is rather mixed
(Currie 1998). One difficulty in establishing the causal effect of transfer incomes on children's outcomes is that welfare 
transfers can create incentives for parents to modify their behaviors. As explained in Moffit (1992), these behavioral 
responses might have additional adverse or positive consequences on children, and they might strengthen or dampen 
the effects of the transfers themselves. For example, a higher benefit rate can create labor market disincentives for
poor parents, leading to lower employment and employment income. It can also facilitate poor parents transitioning
from welfare to employment or moving from unstable, low-skilled jobs to relatively "better" ones. In this case, future 
employment income is likely to increase as a result. The a priori directions of associations between benefit rates and 
family income are thus unclear, and the effect of transfers may depend on the nature of the parents' employment.
6 In this paper, they measure the hours of parental time available for children as total weekly hours less "sleep time", 
less weekly hours of paid work. They argue that weekly rather than annual hours are more relevant for children, since 
care cannot be deferred until a later point in the year. See also Phipps, Burton and Osberg (1996) who find it is weekly 
hours which generate most time stress for adults.
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Studies of U.S. welfare reforms have found maternal employment effects that are favourable for child development 
only when mothers voluntarily chose employment, when they are employed in stable jobs that provide supportive 
working environments, or when maternal employment results in substantially increased family income (i.e. if jobs pay 
more than US$5.00 per hour) (Alessandri 1992; Moore and Driscoll 1997; Miller and Zhang, 2007). In the Canadian 
context, Morris and Michalopoulos (2000) use data from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), a program that 
offered welfare recipients the opportunity to receive an income supplement if they obtained full-time employment.
They find that increased maternal employment results in more problematic behaviour for adolescents, despite of 
increases in family incomes. 7
Relative to the general population of children, there are a number of reasons to expect that income transfers may be 
more important for children living with a disabled parent. First, many studies on the income gradient of child outcomes 
indicate that improvements in parental income at low level have larger developmental gains for children, especially 
when the income is measured as long-term family resources or "permanent income" (Blau 1999; Curtis, Dooley, 
Lipman and Feeny 2001). Even if there are diminishing marginal returns to income transfers, people with disabilities 
are often considered as "the poorest of the poor", and therefore can be expected to have the largest marginal return.
Compared with able-bodied parents, parents with disabilities are not only at greater risk of having low income but 
also of persistent low income. Galarneau and Radulescu (2009), using data from the Canadian 1994-2006 Survey of 
Labor and Income Dynamics (i.e. roughly the same time frame as the data used in current study), find that working-
age Canadian men disabled for two to five years had twice as high a risk, and those disabled for six years had eight 
times the risk of men without a disability; Canadian women disabled for six years were at four times a higher risk than 
non-disabled women. On top of the limited earnings capacity, they may face additional financial costs due to the health 
problems. Doctor or hospital bills are not an issue in Canada, but many other expenses are not covered by public health 
insurance (e.g. wheelchair ramps, hearing aids, travel from a rural area to visit specialists in the city, or "deductibles" 
on drugs) see Burton, Chen, Lethbridge and Phipps (2014).
Second, for families with a disabled parent, transfer income often represents a significant portion of the family budget,
and thus may have more direct and immediate influence on maintaining basic living standards of the household than 
is the case in families with able-bodied parents. The Federal Disability Report indicates that 37 % Canadians with 
disabilities claimed government transfer as their primary source in 2006, whereas the corresponding figure for persons 
without disabilities is 11.9 %. Overall, persons with disabilities were over three times more likely to receive 
government income supplement compared to their counterparts without disabilities (HRSDC 2009).
Third, families with disabilities often also face greater barriers to the cross-spouse substitution of parental hours in 
child care. In contrast to the traditional gender role within household proposed by "identity model" (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000), recent research on spousal care-giving suggests that the presence of a parent with a disability may
shift the gendered division of care in the family (Gordon and Perrone 2004; Hogan, Shandra and Msall 2007; Mann 
and Dieppe 2006; Beauregard and Noreau 2009). The additional demands on time and energy related to having a 
partner with a disability may exacerbate caregiver burden and affect other family roles and responsibilities. Because 
mothers are often responsible for most of the care-giving and domestic labor in the family, the presence of a father 
figure with a disability may place additional strain on a mother's ability to provide family resources. Conversely, when 
a mother is disabled, a father may assume greater child-care responsibilities such as getting involved in home learning 
activities, participating in school programs, or supervising their children’s after-school activities, thus becoming the 
effective care-giver. These responses make sense as a household coping strategy. However it also implies that by 
pushing the non-disabled spouse to work, thereby reducing his or her time spent participating in activities with the 
child, inadequate income support can impair the parents' ability to provide a positive developmental environment for 
children.
7 According to this study, most mothers do not place their adolescent children in structured care after school as they 
did with their younger children. Adolescents may have difficulties if left alone after school and into the evening hours 
as mothers take on off-hours and shift work. They also find adolescent children may be asked to take on greater 
household responsibilities and may be encouraged to engage in employment themselves when their single mothers 
move into employment. While there is limited research on the effects of household chores on children, a high level of 
employment during adolescence (particularly more than 20 hours of employment) has been linked with children’s 
difficulties in school and increased drug and alcohol use.
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3. Provincial Disability Benefit Programs
In Canada, provincial disability benefits are delivered either through the disability component of social assistance 
programs (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia) or through disability support programs that specifically target the disabled (Ontario, Alberta and PEI8). 
Combined, these benefits constitute the second largest income support program for the disabled next to the Canada / 
Quebec Pension Plan (C / QPP) disability benefits. 9
Provincial disability benefits provide needs-tested income assistance for people with disabilities who are either 
ineligible for other benefits or for whom other benefits received are inadequate (e.g. C / QPP disability benefits, the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement, the Spouse’s Allowance, Allowance for the Survivor, or War Veterans Allowance). 
Eligibility for provincial programs includes a needs-test and a work limiting disability. Given that an applicant family’s 
liquid and fixed assets from non-exempted sources do not exceed the maximum allowable levels, 10 disability benefits 
are offset dollar-for-dollar with unearned income (e.g. interest income, pensions, or other needs-tested transfer income) 
and earned income that is not exempt.11 During our study period, only one province changed its basic earnings 
exemption level,12 and importantly, neither earnings exemption nor asset limits in any of the provincial programs is 
indexed for inflation.
Besides the requirements on income and assets, each provincial program also makes benefits conditional on an 
assessment of disability, using its own definition of disability. 13 As shown in Appendix Table 1, however, the 
designation of disability is similar across provinces in the sense that: (1) all provincial programs require applicants to 
submit a medical certificate completed by a licensed physician indicating the level of the impairment and the potential 
for rehabilitation; (2) all provinces also require that the disability must have a substantial impact on the potential 
recipient's usual activities, and has to occur on a continuous or recurrent basis (e.g. last for at least 3-12 months).
Disability benefits under every provincial program consist of a basic allowance intended to cover the cost of food, 
clothing, utilities, personal and household items, and a shelter allowance that covers rent or mortgage. Some provincial 
programs also provide extra benefits to meet special needs such as drug and dental coverage, vision care, medical 
transportation, diabetic supplies, assistive devices and mobility device repairs and batteries. Prior to 1996, the federal 
government funded 50 % of the benefits for all provincial programs through the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), which 
offered a matching grant for provincial spending. Following 1996, a block grant (the Canada Health and Social 
Transfer – CHST) replaced CAP, resulting in substantial reduction in the federal government's contributions. In order 
to accommodate the cuts in federal support, provinces enacted a variety of changes, reducing welfare benefit levels, 
8 The disability support program in PEI provides income support to persons with disabilities on a case-by-case base. 
In this study, we use data on PEI's social assistance program. Alberta also has a distinct program for persons with 
disabilities: the Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped (AISH) program. Different from other provincial 
disability benefit programs, the AISH clients are provided with a flat rate living allowance benefit which is not 
contingent on family size. We replicate our analysis later with children from these two provinces excluded. As are 
shown, our main results are not substantially affected.
9 In 2001, of the 3.42 million adults with disabilities in Canada, 10 % received income support from provincial 
disability benefit programs, about the same proportion as those receiving a Canadian / Quebec Pension Plan (Prince 
2008).
10 All provincial programs exempt most fixed assets, such as principal residence, vehicles (up to a certain limit), the 
value of prepaid funerals and property/equipment required for employment, while liquid assets are only partially 
exempt.
11 All provincial programs exempt a portion of employment income although using slightly different formulae. For 
example, Nova Scotia allows its client families to keep the first $200 of earned total income and one-fourth of earnings 
exceeding $200 per month.
12 PEI increased its basic earnings exemption level from $600 to $900 per month in 2001.
13 Along with the medical certification requirement, an applicant must be of certain age (between 18 and 65) and be 
resident of particular province to be eligible for the benefits.
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tightening eligibility requirements, and imposing work requirements on welfare recipients. As explained in more detail 
in the next section, we utilize the dramatic change in benefits over this period to estimate the effects of parental 
disability benefits on the gap in child well-being.14
Table 1 shows the maximum real annual disability benefits (2008 constant dollars) for a single individual under ten 
provincial programs for the NLSCY survey years, and measures of both cross-section and time-series variations in 
benefit schedules. The data are compiled from various volumes of Welfare Incomes by the National Council of 
Welfare.15 On average, Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Quebec offered the highest annual benefit level at 
$13,385, $12,803, $11,096 and $10,481 per person, respectively, whereas the benefits were lowest in New Brunswick, 
Manitoba and Nova Scotia, which paid $8,685, $9,540 and $9,971 per person annually. In all provinces, the real value 
of disability benefits decreased  (PEI, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan)  during 
the 14 year window or remained roughly constant (Quebec, British Columbia and Newfoundland.16
("Insert Table 1 Here")
4. Empirical Strategy
We use a continuous difference-in-differences (DD) estimator to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity 
associated with parental disability and benefit status. Assuming that the level of disability benefits is determined by 
provincial legislation and the level can only influence children’s outcomes indirectly through individual families’ 
circumstances, correlations between changes in benefit generosity and child outcome measures will imply that 
increasing parental disability income improves child development.
Because these assumptions will be violated if there are unmeasured province-specific transitory shocks that are 
correlated with both benefit generosity and children’s outcomes, we use the children of non-disabled parents who live 
in the same province as comparison group and test whether the outcome gap – i.e. the difference in outcomes between 
children of disabled and non-disabled parents – is related to benefits changes over time.
Specifically, we estimate the following model for a cross-sectional sample, pooling data from 1994-2008 of the 
NLSCY:
(1)
where i is individual child, p is province and t is survey year. Y represents a child’s outcome, DIS is a dummy variable 
indicating the disability status of a parent, and BEN is a continuous variable capturing the real maximum disability 
benefit level that prevailed in the previous year. In this regression, pS includes dummy variables for each of the ten 
14 We use the maximum benefit in the empirical analysis, because we do not know the disability payments that are 
actually received by individuals, and because these would be endogenous with child outcomes.
15 The National Council of Welfare computes the disability benefits as the sum of the basic assistance rate (i.e. amounts 
for food, clothing, shelter and utilities, personal and household needs), additional benefits (i.e. supplementary 
allowances that were automatically provided to persons with a disability), and the provincial tax credit and GST credit 
that are intended for the disabled. These estimates assume a single disabled person who: (1) qualifies for long-term 
rates of assistance; (2) lives in the largest urban area in the province or territory; (3) goes on disability benefits on
January 1 of each year and remains on benefits for the entire calendar year; and (4) is a tenant in the private rental 
market rather than a homeowner or social housing tenant, and who also does not share accommodation.
16 In some provinces, actual entitlement to disability benefits may vary according to the circumstances of each 
individual family, including household size, composition and the children's age. We do not differentiate these family 
types because of data limitation, i.e. the National Council of Welfare did not produce benefit schedules for couple-
families with a disability. Doing so also avoids potential endogeneity in fertility decisions and living arrangements to 
the generosity of needs-tested benefits (Moffitt 1990; Milligan 2005). We are unaware of any systematic legislation 
change that affected benefit schedules for single persons differently than for couple-families with a disability during 
the study period. This paper exploits within-province variations in benefit levels for the single disabled over time, 
which will reflect changes in benefit levels for other family types, unless there was such a change.
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Canadian provinces (i.e. province fixed effects), while tM includes dummy variables for years (i.e. year fixed effects). 
The province fixed effects hold constant unmeasured permanent differences across provinces, such as stable province 
differences in policies, such as regulations in earnings exemptions and asset limits, cost of living, the degree of 
discrimination against disabled people, and other disability-related services. The year fixed effects hold constant any 
time trends that affect all provinces similarly: changes in the federal disability tax credit in year 2004, for example.
Since the disability benefit variable BEN is measured at the province-year level, we do not include any higher order 
interactions between province and year dummies in our preferred model specification. We do, however, experiment 
with an alternative that controls for the full set of province-year fixed effects and obtain highly similar results (more 
details see Section 6).
After centering,17 1E picks up the average difference in outcomes across benefit levels that are common to both the 
children of disabled and non-disabled parents. 2E indicates the average gap in outcome level between the children of 
disabled and non-disabled parents for those who are exposed to the average level of benefits. G is the coefficient of 
interest. If higher disability benefits are associated with better child outcomes, we should expect to see a statistically 
significantG , indicating that the gap in outcomes between the children of disabled and non-disabled parents of the 
same province change when the benefit level varies.
In addition to province and year fixed effects, we include a set of covariates that may influence the well-being of 
children as suggested by existing literature: child age (in months) and age squared; gender; school grade; 18 both 
parents' age (in years) and age squared, parents' immigration status (a dummy that equals one if either parent is an 
immigrant and zero otherwise), both parents' education in three categories (less than high school; high school graduate; 
and post-secondary diploma or some post-secondary education but not a degree), and interaction terms between both 
parents' education and disability status to allow for a differential impact of parental education between children with 
and without a disabled parent. Later, we also add a set of parental employment variables to examine the pathways 
through which parental disability transfers may benefit children. Importantly, since family income can be influenced 
by the size of the benefit, it is left out of our equation to avoid the introduction of a mechanical endogeneity.
It is possible that there is another provincial program that changes when the disability benefits program changes (e.g., 
because the province is cutting spending) and, though available to all children, is particularly relevant for children of 
disabled parents than for other children. If so, the effect of this program will be captured by the DIS x BEN variable 
and bias our estimates upward. To address this issue, we conduct two robustness checks.
First, we replicate the cross-sectional analysis with a sample that includes a more advantaged group: children of 
parents with a university degree. We compare benefit effect on outcome gaps between children of parents with and 
without disabilities and neither of the parents have a university degree, relative to the benefit effect on outcome gaps 
for children who have at least one parent with a university degree. Parents with a university degree may be more likely 
to hold skilled, stable jobs and less likely to file for welfare or be influenced by changes in means-tested benefits (but 
perhaps not by changes in other types of transfer programs). Finding smaller or non-existent effects among children 
of parents with a university degree would indicate that the impact of transitory provincial shocks is removed through 
our research design.
Second, we conduct a placebo analysis using an alternative type of expenditure that may be relevant for child well-
being, provincial spending on public and private elementary and secondary education per school-age child. If the
17 We subtract the sample mean from each respective benefit level.
18 Since the difficulty of the math test in the NLSCY varies with the school grade of the child, the standardized scores 
increases as a child grows older (Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete 2008). We thus include parent-report school grade 
(K through ten) for the child in our regression. Inclusion of this variable causes less than 2 % of four- to five-year olds 
who did not attend kindergarten to drop out of our estimation sample. In a robustness check that is not reported in this 
paper, inclusion of these children does not affect our results qualitatively (available upon request). In another study 
that uses the same data source (i.e. the NLSCY), we find only a very small number of children in grade K through 
four who do not comply with the school entry regulations in their year/province (Chen, Phipps and Fortin 2015). Our 
data is consistent with this finding.
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estimated impact of disability benefit should, in fact, be attributed to changes in other public policies that are all 
potentially caused by the same provincial budget cut, a significant association between this policy variable and child 
outcomes should be expected.
In addition, the benefit claim, benefit duration and the incidence of self-reported disability may be positively 
influenced by the generosity of disability benefits (Fortin, Lacroix and Drolet 2004). If so, it may be that higher 
disability benefits change the composition of the disabled population rather than actually affecting child outcomes. As 
well, if parents with disabilities move to provinces that offer relatively more generous benefits, the resulting benefit 
effects will be mis-specified. To explore these possibilities, we first take advantage of the longitudinal structure of the 
NLSCY and conduct a panel DD analysis. While parental disability information in the NLSCY is not available for 
1996 and 1998, we can pool three two-period panels that track three cohorts of children over six calendar years. These 
children aged 6-9 when first observed in 1994, 2000 and 2002 and 12-15 when last observed in 2000, 2006 and 
2008 (more details are provided in Section 5). Based on this longitudinal sample, we estimate a child fixed effect 
model:
ipttiptipptptipt XDISBENBENY HMTGEE '''u'' ' 10 (2)
Here ' represents the first difference of any variable between two adjacent time periods. Compared to the level 
specification for the cross-sectional sample (equation (1)), this model relies on more rigorous identifying assumptions. 
Any permanent unobserved parental characteristics associated with parental disability, and consequently the 
achievement gaps between children of disabled and non-disabled parents are removed in this first-difference setting. 19
The panel DD estimator thus identifies the impact of disability benefit amount by considering only changes in child 
outcomes over time.
When estimating the panel models, we exclude children whose parents reported a change in disability status during 
the observation period to rule out the possibility of our results being driven by sample composition or reporting bias. 
In other words, our longitudinal sample is restricted to children whose parents reported a disability in both periods 
(i.e. “always disabled”) and children whose parents never reported a disability (i.e. “always non-disabled”) so that the 
same group of children are compared when benefits are high than low. We subsequently compare the results based on 
samples where children are allowed to move, where all moves are “reset” assuming that they lived in their original 
provinces, and where movers are excluded to assess the extent to which potential migration response to disability 
benefit levels may have influenced our estimated benefit effect.
We also investigate the heterogeneity of our results by considering the gender of the disabled parent. 20 Evidence from 
a preliminary analysis on the underlying mechanisms is also presented. A more detailed discussion on the rationales
and the methodology used is provided in Section 6 below.
Finally, we emphasize that this study uses an intention-to-treat design -- we do not actually know whether a particular 
disabled parent filed for or received disability benefits. Rather we examine whether a change in benefit generosity has 
an impact on the population most likely to be affected (i.e., disabled parents with low education). The analytic sample 
may include ineligible disabled parents as part of the treated group and also eligible parents who do not actually 
receive disability benefits. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) thus depends on the proportion of eligible 
19 For example, less patient parents may be more likely to engage in risky behavior, experience disability, and at the 
same time invest less time and money in children.
20 The sample of children living in lone mothers where the lone mother had a disability was unfortunately too small 
to produce reliable estimates.  To the extent that such families may be most affected by higher disability benefits, we 
may be underestimating effect size.
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parents included in the sample, and the proportion of eligible parents who actually take up the benefits. 21 All reported
analyses use sampling weights, and the standard errors are clustered at the province level to account for a potential 
serial correlation on observations of children in the same province over time. 22
5. Data, Sample, and Measures
Empirical analysis is based on the 1994-2008 National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (NLSCY), 
combined with province-level data capturing variations in disability benefit levels. The NSLCY is an on-going survey 
of Canadian children and youth, designed to help analyze child development and well-being. Starting in 1994, it has 
followed a nationally representative sample of children aged between 0 and 11 years at two-year intervals until they 
reach the age of 25. At each survey round, a new cohort of children aged 0-1 was added to the longitudinal files 
allowing for the construction of a sizable cross-sectional sample. A unique feature of the NLSCY is that it provides 
inter-generational information on parents' activity limitation, and a variety of children’s developmental outcomes 
along with detailed socio-economic characteristics of both parents. For every selected child under 17 years of age, a 
question is asked to identify who in the household is most knowledgeable about the child (PMK). The PMK then 
provides the information for each selected child and for him/herself and him/her spouse/partner. In over 98 % of cases, 
the PMK is the mother of the child.
For our main estimation sample, we use data from 1994, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 of the NLSCY, and restrict 
attention to non-disabled children aged between 4 and 15 years old who lived in two-parent families. These are the 
years when most children should be attending kindergarten through grade ten. Data from 1996 and 1998 and for
children aged 16 years or above are omitted because the set of questions on parental disabilities was not available. We 
also exclude younger children from our analysis to avoid the complex task of differentiating the program effects from 
the effects of schooling. In addition, certain disabling conditions can be transmitted genetically. In order to focus on 
the effect of disability benefits and minimize the risk of its effect being confounded with that of the child's own health 
problems, we exclude children with disabilities. Finally, divorce / re-marriage can involve non-income-related stress 
for both children and their parents, which would be difficult to separate from benefit changes at the same time. To 
obtain the cleanest estimates possible, we focus on children of intact families.23 Children of single parents are later 
included into our analysis to obtain a more representative estimate for all children who may be affected by the benefit 
generosity.
Because the purpose of this study was to examine the effects of the program on child well-being, we include only a 
subset of families that are most likely to be eligible for the disability benefits. Specifically, we select children in 
families where both parents are between 18 and 65 years, since provincial welfare programs required beneficiaries to
be of 18-65 age. In addition, since needs-tested disability benefits target low-income families and tend to have the 
largest impact on people with lower education, we select children in families where neither parent has a university 
degree.
21 Data on the take-up rate of means-tested disability benefits in Canada are unfortunately difficult to obtain. Based 
on our only source of information, Prince (2008), using the 2001 Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) 
reports that, of the 3.42 million of Canadian adults with disabilities, 10 % received income support from provincial 
disability benefit programs. If the vast majority of benefit recipients do not have a university degree, the benefit take-
up rate can be around 15 % among the population under analysis, since about 70 % of children reported to live with 
parents neither of whom has a university degree during our study period. If true, the ATT effect of disability benefits 
should be 6-7 times as large as the size of the ITT effect estimated in current paper. However, since the unit of analysis 
in the NLSCY is the child instead of the adult, above extrapolation is rather crude and cautions should be taken in 
interpretation.
22 Given our main coefficient of interest is the benefit effect on children, we choose to cluster standard errors at the 
highest level with the smallest number of clusters, which is a relatively conservative strategy. Clustering at the 
household level produces qualitatively similar results.
23 Children living in lone-parent families make up only 3 % of all children aged between 4 and 15 years in the NLSCY.
To the extent that lower benefits may increase the chance of parental separation / divorce and/or such families may be 
most affected by changes in benefit levels, we may be underestimating effect size.
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We consider three domains of children’s developmental outcomes: cognitive, behavioural and emotional well-being. 
Cognitive outcomes are measured by children’s standardized math test score. The math test (CAT/2 test) in the 
NLSCY is designed to measure a child's basic competencies in math (e.g. addition, subtraction, multiplication and 
division of integers) and is administered to children in grade 2 to 10 every year. It is a shorter version of the 
Mathematics Computation Test taken from the Canadian Achievement Test, 2nd edition, with scores ranging from 0 
to 750.  The hyperactivity score is derived from six statements by the PMK about the child having trouble sitting still 
or being restless, being easily distracted, being inattentive, having trouble sticking to any activity, concentrating, 
paying attention for long, being impulsive, acting without thinking, having difficulty waiting for his turn in games or 
groups. The emotional anxiety score is derived from six statements about the child being unhappy or sad, not as happy 
as other children, fearful or nervous, worried, crying a lot, being high strung or tense, having trouble enjoying himself 
or herself. Parents respond to these two scores on a scale ranging from 0 to 14, with 14 indicating the highest level of 
hyperactivity or emotional anxiety.24
We define parental disability to be a functional restriction in activities performed at home, at school, at work, in other 
activities such as transportation to or from work or leisure time activities, or in caring for children. 25 Note that these 
are not mutually exclusive categories -- more than 80 % of parents in our main estimation sample indicated limitations 
in multiple functional domains. For this reason and also to obtain the largest sample size possible, we do not distinguish 
children of parents who suffer from disabilities in different functional domains, though the impact of disability on 
parenting, and hence the extent to which income transfers may alter child outcomes can vary with the nature of the 
disability. 26
Based on this definition, 20 % of children under analysis lived with at least one disabled parent (the bottom row of 
Table 2). This group consists of all children aged 4 to 15 years in two-parent families where neither parents has a 
university degree and where the child himself/herself did not have a disability. Out of this total, 10 % lived with a 
disabled mother, 9.8 % lived with a disabled father, and 2.7 % lived with two disabled parents. Summary statistics of
family characteristics for these children are provided in Table 2. Several features are noticeable. First, parents with 
disabilities were slightly older than parents without disabilities (mean ages of mothers and fathers are 38.8 vs. 38.1 
and 41.8 vs. 40.2), as are their non-disabled spouses (mean ages of mothers and fathers are 38.8 vs. 38.1 and 41.2 vs. 
40.2). Second, relative to parents without disabilities, parents with disabilities have lower education (16.8 % and 22.7
% dropped out of high school as compared to 15.2 % and 19.5 % of able-bodied mothers and fathers),27 and are less 
likely to be employed (probabilities of working for mothers and fathers are 70 % vs. 80 % and 88 % vs. 97 %). Even 
if they have a job, they tend to work less hours during a week (mean weekly hours for mothers and fathers are 23.4 
vs. 27.4 and 38.2 vs. 43.2) and are less likely to be employed full-time (probabilities of working more than 30 hours 
per week for mothers and fathers are 47.8 % vs. 56.5 % and 83 % vs. 94.5 %). Third, the socioeconomic characteristics 
of their non-disabled spouses tend to be more similar to those of parents in families without a disabled parent. 29 % 
of non-disabled fathers in mother-disabled families and 32.4 % of non-disabled mothers in father-disabled families 
had some post-secondary education (but not a university degree), compared to 27.3 % and 26.9 % of their non-disabled 
counterparts. In addition, both non-disabled mothers in father-disabled families and non-disabled fathers in mother-
disabled families work more than parents in families without disabilities, especially on the intensive margin: 57.4 % 
24 Earlier cycles contained an additional question for each scale. We re-constructed these scales by dropping this 
question so they can be compared consistently across cycles.
25 The survey question that we used to identify parental disability in the NLSCY is as follows: “Because of a long-
term physical or mental condition or a health problem, are/is ... ... ... limited in the kind or amount of activity 
you/he/she can do: 1) At home? 2) At school? 3) At work? 4) In other activities such as transportation to or from work 
or leisure time activities? 5) In caring for children?”. If the parent answered "yes" to any of the above items for herself 
or her spouse, parental disability is coded one indicating disabled, otherwise zero for non-disabled.
26 In assessing the impact of parental disability on parenting, we conduct a simple descriptive analysis on the 
association between disabilities of different functional domains and child outcomes (see Appendix Table 3). In general, 
all types except for limitations at transportation/leisure/other are associated with significantly worse outcomes of 
children even after adjusting for child gender, age and school grade. There is, however, no clear pattern suggesting 
one matters more than another, possibly due to the high correlation among the limitations reported in different 
functional domains.
27 A chi-squared test for group difference suggests a statistically significant difference for the latter.
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of non-disabled mothers in father-disabled families and 95.2 % of non-disabled fathers in mother-disabled families 
worked more than 30 hours per week, whereas the corresponding figures for their non-disabled counterparts are 56.5 
% and 94.5 %, respectively.
('Insert Table 2 Here')
Relative to families of non-disabled parents, the equivalent family income for families with a disabled parent was 
approximately 5 % lower. 28 Taking Statistics Canada’s Low-Income-Cut-Off (LICO) as an unofficial poverty line 
shows that having a disabled parent in the household almost doubled the incidence of poverty among these children: 
13.5 % of children with disabled parents lived below the LICO while the corresponding number for children with non-
disabled parents was only 9.1 %. There is also considerable heterogeneity depending on the gender of the disabled 
parent: families in which the mother is disabled are much less likely to be in low-income situations than families with 
a disabled father. The former thus seems to have significantly lowered the risk of poverty status by having a high-
earning male spouse in the family.
Despite differences in income, children of disabled parents consistently do worse than their peers with non-disabled 
parents (upper panel of Table 3). Cross-tabulation of children's outcomes suggests that children of disabled parents on 
average score 8 % of one standard deviation lower on standardized math tests and living with a disabled parent is 
associated with a 13 % and 16 % of one standard deviations more hyperactive symptoms and anxiety behavior.
Compared to children of fathers with a disability, children of mothers with a disability appear to fare worse (columns 
3 and 4 of Table 3). Results based on a larger sample that includes children of parents with a university degree reveal 
more or less the same story (lower panel of Table 3).
('Insert Table 3 Here')
To get a sense of whether family income is more important for families with a disabled parent, we estimate, for 
descriptive purposes, two child outcome equations: 1) for children of disabled, and; 2) for children of non-disabled 
parents (Table 4).  Conditional on the set of child and parent characteristics discussed above, family equivalent income 
does not appear to have a stronger association with the hyperactivity or anxiety of children with a disabled parent, but 
is strongly associated with math score. 29 However, acquiring the same level of income may involve very different 
amounts of time (e.g. in one- versus two-earners families), and parental time is another key determinant of child 
outcomes. In the analysis to follow, we thus use a more sophisticated approach to examine this hypothesis.
('Insert Table 4 Here')
Aside from the NLSCY, information on provincial regulations, such as disability benefit levels, is compiled from 
various issues of Welfare Incomes (1993-2007), Social Assistance Statistics Report (2004-2007), and each provincial 
program's website. Since most family income and parents’ labour market activities in the NLSCY are reported 
retrospectively over a 12-month period, we use the disability benefit schedule that prevailed in January of the previous 
calendar year. The program data is then merged to the NLSCY data based on the province of residence reported by 
individual households. All benefits and income data are converted into 2008 dollars using the corresponding provincial 
seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index.30
28 In this study, we use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) scale to calculate "equivalent income." The LIS scale is 
calculated as the square root of family size.
29 For the sake of completeness, we also report coefficients on other covariates in the model. These results indicate 
that: (1) conditional on school grade, older children score higher on standardized math test, but tend to exhibit more 
hyperactive symptoms and anxiety behavior; (2) boys do better at math tests but suffer more hyperactive symptoms 
than girls; (3) compared with children of high school dropouts, children of parents with a high school degree or post-
secondary education have better outcomes in all three cases. 
30 Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2011 basket content is from Statistics Canada's CANSIM (database) Table 326-0021: 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/home-accueil?lang=eng. Access on April 4, 2013.
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6. Empirical Results
6.1. Effects of Parental Disability Benefits on Children's Well-being
Table 5 presents DD estimates of equation (1) above for the pooled cross-sectional sample. As earlier noted, the key 
variable of interest in the regressions on children's outcomes is the interacted variable [Benefits*Disability]. For each 
outcome, Table 5 reports results from three model specifications. Column (1) adjusts only for year fixed effects, child's 
age in month, gender and school grade. Estimates from this most basic model reveal a positive association between 
the generosity of disability benefits and children's math test scores, and negative associations between the benefits,
hyperactive symptoms and emotional anxiety, where a higher value indicates worse outcomes. In column (2), 
indicators that control for province fixed effects are added to the regressions. If provinces that provide higher benefits 
tend to be generous in other public spending programs, and if these programs have especially favourable impacts on 
children with disabled parents, adding in these controls would reduce the estimated benefit effects – but column (2) 
lends little support to this hypothesis. There is a moderate drop in the estimated benefit effect on math scores, and the 
magnitude of the estimates for hyperactivity and anxiety increases slightly, which suggests that the unmeasured 
heterogeneity across provinces is unlikely to explain the observed link between the child's outcome gap and parental 
disability benefits. In columns (3) and (4), the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics of both parents and the set 
of province-year fixed effects again does not change the results substantially.31 As one would expect, the fit of the 
regressions (adjusted 2R ) increases significantly as the province fixed effects and parental background are controlled 
for. For reasons stated in Section 4, we treat model (3) as our preferred model specification.
('Insert Table 5 Here')
The results from column (3) imply that a $1,000 reduction in real disability benefits 32 results in a 1 % of a standard 
deviation (1.02 point) decrease in math scores, 3.7 % of a standard deviation (0.11 point) and 2.8 % of a standard 
deviation (0.06 point) increase in hyperactive symptoms and emotional anxiety. Hence, a cut in real benefits by $3,000, 
the equivalent of cuts enacted in Ontario between 1994-2000 (i.e. around 10 % of the equivalent family income for 
families with a disabled parent in the sample) will reduce standardized math test scores for children with disabled 
parents by 3 % of a standard deviation, and increase hyperactive symptoms and anxiety by 11 and 8 % of a standard 
deviation, respectively. To put these estimates in context, in the same specification mothers having a high school 
degree (compared to dropping out) is respectively associated with 12, 14 and 10 % of a standard deviation 
improvement in math test score, hyperactive and anxiety symptoms (results not reported but available upon request).
In other words, the effect of a $3,000 benefit reduction is one third as large as the magnitude of the association between 
maternal high school education and math score, and nearly as large as the association between maternal high school 
education and child hyperactivity and anxiety. Relative to gains in cognitive functioning, the effects of disability 
benefits on the child's behavioural and emotional well-being seem more substantial.33
The parental disability variable indicates that children with disabled parents on average score lower in standardized 
math tests and exhibit more hyperactive and anxiety problems than their peers with non-disabled parents.34 The 
coefficient on benefit levels, suggests that all children in a province tend to do worse in years when disability benefits
are higher. Since real disability benefits decreased in most provinces during our study period, this result may partially 
reflect the within-province time trend in child outcomes, which encompasses the effects of various concurrent province 
expenditures on child outcomes.
31 A fully interacted model that includes interaction between parental disability dummy and every single covariate in 
the regression produces highly similar results (available upon request).
32 In our regression analysis, the disability benefit variable is measured in 1,000 dollars.
33 Cognitive achievement is more likely to be linked to the cumulative process of human capital acquisition (Todd and 
Wolpin 2007) as opposed to external shocks, such as variations in family income, or parental stress associated with 
employment.
34 We do not attach any fundamental meaning to these estimates since in the presence of interaction terms, their 
magnitude and significance merely reflect the group difference at the average benefit level and whether or not this 
difference is statistically different from zero at this point.
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6.2. Correlated Policies 
To test the robustness of our main results, we first present two variants of the DD cross-sectional estimates in Table 
5. Table 6 shows results that are estimated based on the sample of children either of whose parents has a university 
degree. The model specification is identical to that in column (3) of Table 5. For ease of comparison, we reproduce 
the results from our original model in column (1). As shown before, for children in families where neither parent has 
a university degree, there is a positive and statistically significant association between changes in children’s outcome 
gaps and changes in disability benefits. The results presented in column (2) for children in families where at least one 
parent has a university degree, however, are strikingly different. Despite the qualitatively similar estimates for the 
main effects of parental disability and disability benefit levels, the coefficients on their interaction terms are small in 
magnitude and insignificant at any conventional level for all outcomes. In the case of emotional anxiety, the sign of 
the estimated effects is even reversed. This sharp contrast suggests that most of the associations between disability 
benefits and children’s developmental outcomes are driven by children whose parents have lower education, who are 
the target population of means-tested disability benefits.
('Insert Table 6 Here')
Table 7 presents results from a placebo analysis using another type of expenditure that is relevant for child well-being, 
provincial spending on public and private elementary and secondary education. In the construction of this variable, 
we normalize the raw data by the total number of school-age children in a given province-year, and convert it into 
2008 constant dollars using corresponding provincial Consumer Price Index. We refer to it as "education spending per 
capita". 35 To be consistent with our previous analysis of disability benefits, we use the expenditure amount in the 
calendar year preceding the survey date. The results of this estimation are provided in columns (2) and (3) of Table 7. 
Column (2) augments our original model with education spending per capita as a further control. The inclusion of this 
alternative measure has negligible impact on our estimated benefit effects. Column (3) re-estimates our model 
replacing the level of disability benefits with that of education spending per capita. In all three cases, the estimated 
effect of provincial education expenditure on children of disabled parents is small and insignificant. The magnitude is 
between 2 % and 30 % as large as those we obtain for disability benefits. Finding that changes in provincial 
expenditures on education are unrelated to the developmental outcome gap of children with disabled parents provides 
some evidence that our results are unlikely to be attributed to concurrent changes in other public policies (e.g., because 
the provincial budget is tight).
('Insert Table 7 Here')
6.3. Sample Composition, Endogenous Treatment Status and Migration
Besides correlated policies, there are several other ways, in which our identifying assumption can be violated, from 
sample composition change, from selection into disability status, or from inter-provincial migration in response to 
different disability benefit levels. In this section, we explore these possibilities with alternative techniques and data 
samples.
Table 8 presents panel DD estimates of equation (2) for our longitudinal sample that includes three cohorts of children 
aged between 6/9 (at the first observation) and 12/15 (at the second observation). To ensure the same group of children 
is compared when the benefits are high versus low, we keep children in families where there was no change in parental 
disability status.  This effectively removes all children in families where a parent experienced the "onset" of a disability 
or "recovered" from a negative health event. Due to data constraints, we are only able to examine children's 
performance on standardized math tests for this analysis.36
35 Data on the provincial expenditure of education (Table 478-0014) and Consumer Price Index (Table 326-0021)
were retrieved on April 4, 2013 from Statistics Canada's CANSIM (database): //www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/home-
accueil?lang=eng. We extrapolate the total number of school-age children by province by year using data from cycles 
1-8 of the NLSCY.
36 As part of Early Child Development (ECD) initiative, the NLSCY dropped many young children aged 6-10 from 
its cross-sectional sample in later cycles. Standardized math test score thus is the only outcome for which there is 
sufficient sample in each year to enable comparisons over time.
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('Insert Table 8 Here')
The first three columns of Table 8 show, respectively, the results from child-fixed effects based on the full sample, a 
sample that “resets” all movers to their original provinces, and a sub-sample that excludes all inter-provincial 
movers. 37 These results indicate even stronger benefit effects on children of disabled parents. Overall, a $1,000 
decrease in disability benefit leads to 7 % of one standard deviation reduction in math test scores. Taking into account 
possible migration response to disability benefit levels by assuming all children remain in their original provinces also 
enhances the estimated effect of disability benefits. Excluding all movers from the estimation sample results in a 
slightly smaller but still statistically significant estimated effect. This confirms that migration responses do not drive 
our main findings.
Relative to the cross-sectional DD estimates, the effect size of disability benefits from our panel estimation is 
substantially larger, which may reflect a combination of three factors. First, given that we exclude switchers, and only 
consider individuals who were disabled all years in the panel DD estimates, it is possible that these individuals are on 
average more likely to actually get the benefit with respect to the individuals in the cross-sectional sample, and the 
ITT is for this reason closer to being an ATT in this sample. Second, the use of child fixed effects eliminates the 
downward bias in our cross-sectional estimates that is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity associated with 
parental disability.  Parents with disabilities may be disadvantaged relative to parents without disabilities in both the
labor market and home activities in ways that are unobservable to us. Without adequately controlling for these 
differences or without a randomization strategy, worse developmental outcomes of the child can be attributed to
parental disability without necessarily a causal interpretation. Third, children of parents with a long-term disability 
are the least well-off, thus improvement in parental incomes is likely to generate larger beneficial effects than for 
children of parents only temporarily disabled.
As discussed in Section 3, PEI changed its basic earnings exemption level during our observation period (from $600 
to $900 per month in 2001). The disability benefit program in Alberta (i.e. the Assured Income for the Severely 
Handicapped (AISH)) also has rules that are somewhat different from those in the rest of Canada. The last six columns 
of Table 8 report results after excluding children residing in these two provinces. The benefit effect estimates are very 
similar to the ones reported earlier. Any potential bias in the estimated results stemming from differences in other 
parameters of the program should thus be small.
Finally, we determine treatment (intent-to-treat) status using parents' self-reported activity limitation status. An 
advantage of this approach relative to using actual disability benefit receipt is that it seems less likely to be affected
by economic incentives. Yet there is still a possibility that respondents mis-report disability status as a justification 
for other behaviors, such as less intensive work hours or benefit claims when the disability benefit level is high. For 
instance, Haveman and Wolfe (2000) suggest that the self-reported presence of a work limitation may increase for 
workers in redundant industries or for older workers during periods of high unemployment.
Results from our panel DD estimation provide indirect proof that this behavior pattern is not extensive in our context.
We now take a more direct approach to examine this hypothesis by estimating a linear probability model of the 
probability of parental disability as a function of the benefit level, while controlling for the same set of controls as in 
our original model (see Table 9). Consistent with existing literature, these results indicate that self-reported disability 
is more prevalent for non-immigrant parents, as well as parents with less than high school education. Conditional on 
the set of child- and parent-characteristics, however, there is no relationship between benefit levels and the reported 
incidence of parental disability.
('Insert Table 9')
Given a disabling condition, an individual may be granted benefit status in one province but not the other, depending 
on the stringency of the screening process. Ideally, we would like to conduct an empirical analysis on the association 
between changes in benefit size with the take-up rates within provinces over time, but data are difficult to obtain. 38
37 Less than 2 % of children in the estimation samples moved inter-provincially during our study period.
38 Apart from published statistics, we cannot find any existing studies that estimate, or extrapolate the rate of take-up 
for a means-tested disability benefit program in Canada.
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Instead, we collect information on the numbers of cases and recipients for a representative province, Ontario (i.e.
Ontario Disability Support Program), and compare this to the level of the benefit prevailing at the same time (see 
Appendix Table 2). Overall, it seems that the administrators tend to get more "lenient" when the benefit level is lower.
All else being equal, if, on average applicants who were admitted into the programs were of better health over time
(given that benefit levels declined over time), this would imply a potential under-estimation of the true benefit effect
in our context.39 Therefore, even with a likely downward bias, our estimates suggest a beneficial impact of parental 
disability benefits on the well-being of children.
6.4. Maternal versus Paternal Disability Benefit Effects
Does it matter whether it is the mother or father who is disabled? On the one hand, traditional gender roles assign 
home production and care for children primarily to mothers, so their disability especially impedes the delivery of time 
inputs. On the other hand, because male wages tend to be higher, disability will likely have a larger impact on 
household living standards when the father is disabled – so the father’s disability may especially affect material inputs 
in home production. There may also be a gendered disincentive effect of disability benefits across disabled fathers and 
mothers. Given a certain level of benefit, mothers with a disabled spouse may be less likely to increase their labour 
supply relative to fathers with a disabled spouse because of a “nursing effect” (e.g. Berger and Fleisher 1984; Berger 
1983). If lower benefits push poor parents, especially the non-disabled fathers to work long hours and thus reduce 
time spent with the child, a reduction in disability benefit level may be more detrimental to children with a disabled 
mother than children with a disabled father. The bottom two panels of Table 10 investigate this issue by separately
estimating model (3) in Table 5 for children in families with only the mother or only the father being disabled. For 
ease of interpretation, we omit children with both parents disabled. 40 For children of mothers with a disability, the 
benefit effect estimates are significant across outcomes and, even though the treated cases are reduced by half, their 
magnitudes are even larger than the ones reported in column (3) of Table 5, suggesting that the favourable impact of 
benefit changes discovered before is mainly concentrated on children in families where the mother is disabled. Ceteris 
paribus, a $1,000 benefit reduction results in a 2 % of one standard deviation reduction in math test scores, and a 6 
and 5 % of one standard deviation increase in parent-report hyperactive and anxiety symptoms. In direct contrast, the 
benefit effect estimates for children of fathers with a disability are all insignificant with considerably smaller 
magnitudes.
('Insert Table 10')
6.5. Exploring Mechanisms 
As noted before, means-tested disability benefits can create incentives for parents to modify their behaviors. A benefit 
reduction thus may hurt children by lowering family income (material inputs in home production) or by increasing 
parental employment (thereby reducing time spent participating in activities with children). To gain further insights 
into the underlying mechanisms through which parental disability benefits may affect child well-being, we examine 
whether there is evidence that parental employment and family income are affected by lowered benefits. Given the 
existing evidence on a potential asymmetric “added worker effect” across disabled husbands and wives (e.g. Coile 
2004), we estimate separate models of labor supply for disabled fathers and mothers. 41
39 In addition, most existing research in Canadian context seems to agree that the rise and fall of the number of people 
on welfare do not coincide with benefit levels. As pointed out by a survey by the National Council of Welfare (1998), 
every significant study has shown that welfare caseload growth tends to coincide with periods of recession and rise of 
unemployment. It is not the meager benefit levels that attract people to welfare or discourage them from leaving to 
find a job.
40 Around 200 children, representing 10% of all children with at least one disabled parents are excluded from our 
estimation samples.
41 The NLSCY contains retrospective information on labour market activities for both parents such as paid work 
participation, usual weekly hours, and family income received from all sources (before taxes), 12 months prior to the 
survey. Parents reported their hours of work in six categories: less than 10 hours, 10-19 hours, 20-29 hours, 30-39
hours, 40-49 hours and 50 hours or more. We create a pseudo continuous variable coded at the mid-point of each 
category to capture the non-linear nature of parental hours, and another indicator variable that identifies a parent's 
full-time work status (i.e. equal to one if a parent works 30 hours or more), to test the effect of hours of work.
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Table 11 presents DD estimates for models of parental weekly hours of work, full-time employment, defined as 
exceeding 30 hours per week (columns (1)-(4)), and family income (columns (5)). 42 The upper, middle and lower 
panel show, respectively, results for children in the estimation samples of math score, hyperactivity and anxiety, 
respectively. Columns (1)-(2) show a large and negative labor supply effect of disability benefits for the disabled 
parents. For every $1,000 decrease in annual benefits, disabled mothers and fathers increase their time spent in the 
labor market by 0.70 and 0.67 hours per week, respectively. The change in paid hours in both cases is mainly driven 
by an increase in the extent of full-time employment. Living in a province with a benefit reduction of $1,000 increases 
the probability of engaging in a full-time job for both disabled mothers and fathers by around 0.02 percentage points. 43
Columns (3)-(4) show an asymmetric added worker effect for the non-disabled spouses. A $1,000 decline in the 
disability benefits leads the non-disabled father to increase his time spent in the labour market by 0.3-0.5 hours per 
week (1 % of the average hours of work), and increases his probability of participating in full-time employment by 
around 1 percentage point. In contrast, the effects on non-disabled mothers are much smaller and statistically 
insignificant.44
('Insert Table 11 Here')
The benefit effect on family income is negative in both cases (column (5)). Consistent with the missing added worker 
effect, lower benefits results in a greater increase in income for families with a disabled mother (every $1,000 benefit 
reduction associated with 2.5 % increase in real equivalent family income versus 1.9 % for families where the father 
is disabled 45), in which poorer child outcomes are observed.
Taken together, these results suggest that the link between lower benefits and increased time away from home of the 
non-disabled father may be what causes poorer child outcomes. To further test the plausibility of this hypothesis, we 
re-estimate our original models for children of disabled mothers, adding both mother and father's labor market 
variables (Table 12). If the benefit effect operates through this channel, we would expect the estimated benefit effect 
coefficient to decline under this specification. Results in column (2) of Table 12 suggest that, after additionally 
controlling for parental employment, the estimated association between disability benefits and child's math test scores 
diminishes, though those in child hyperactivity and emotional anxiety equations are not substantially affected. The 
statistical significance of the benefit effect coefficient completely disappears, and its quantitative magnitude drops 
moderately. The interaction between the non-disabled father’s full-time employment and maternal disability is 
significant on its own, indicating that having the non-disabled father working long hours negatively affects children 
in families with a disabled mother more than those with an able-bodied mother.
('Insert Table 12 Here')
Of course, parents' employment status and working hours can be endogenous to child outcomes. If fathers who are 
able to work longer hours differ from those who do not in ways that benefit children (e.g. better health), the unobserved 
heterogeneity may generate an upward bias for the estimated effects. As well, they can be related to the degree of 
disability, for which we are unfortunately not able to control in this study due to the lack of data. We thus interpret 
this result as preliminary evidence. However, the finding of a stronger association between the non-disabled father's 
42 As mentioned before, a reduction in disability benefits will both directly decrease poor families' disposable 
incomes and induce poor parents to participate more in paid work. Although a negative association between benefit 
level and parental paid work for both the disabled parent and his or her non-disabled spouse is to be expected, the 
benefit effect on family income is ambiguous.
43 Considering that in our sample mothers’ average weekly hours is lower than fathers’, the size of benefit effect for 
own-labour supply is slightly larger for disabled mothers than disabled fathers.
44 Overall, there seems to be an asymmetric incentive effects on spousal labour supply – as the benefit level declines, 
fathers of disabled spouse increase their full-time employment and hours of work. By contrast, wives of disabled 
spouse do not behave differently. The pattern is consistent with previous research on the effect of spousal ill-health 
on labour supply in particular, husband’s health on wife’s labour supply in North America (Berger and Fleisher 
1984; Berger 1983; Gallipoli and Turner 2009), and studies related to spill-over effects of public transfer payments 
in the U.S. (e.g. Colie 2004). However, cautions should be taken in interpretation since the unit of analysis in the 
NLSCY is the child instead of the adult. Even though the results can be replicated when one parent per child is 
randomly selected (results available upon request), further analysis using alternative data sources is needed. 
45 Log of family income measure is used in column (5).
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time and child's cognition than behavioural outcomes is in line with Curtis and Phipps (2006), who find available 
parental time to be a correlate of school success but not general health for children in the NLSCY. Presumably, time 
is a particularly important input both for direct help with homework, enriching outings and reading to children, for 
example, and for indirect support of school activities (e.g. home and school work, volunteering at the school, going 
along on school outings). As well, a father's long work hours could also impose stress on a family from which parents 
cannot successfully shield the child. It is unfortunately not feasible to estimate a model of parental stress or depression 
in this scenario, as Milligan and Stabile (2011) did, because depression could well be a cause or result of the mother’s 
disability, or, could even be the mother’s disability.
Alternatively, the “good mother hypothesis” might explain why the developmental returns of parental disability 
benefits may be larger for children with disabled mothers than children with disabled fathers. If a mother’s income is 
more likely than a father’s income to be spent in ways that benefit the child, given a disabling condition, benefits 
received by the mother may increase her independent access to family financial resources, enhance her bargaining 
power in household expenditure decision-making process and thus have a larger positive effect on child well-being. 
When Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) studied the effect of a change in family allowance benefits which decreases 
father’s net income in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, they found that expenditures on children’s clothing 
increased significantly relative to expenditures on men's clothing as a result of this policy change. Woolley (2004) 
uses data from Canada and finds that the monthly child tax benefits paid to mothers relieves women's financial 
dependence and are more likely to be spent on children.
7. Conclusions
This paper has asked: 1) Do higher disability benefits reduce the gap in child outcomes between the children of 
disabled and non-disabled parents? 2) If so, are the benefit effects different depending on the gender of the disabled 
parent? 3) Finally, what are the mechanisms that drive these differences? Using changes in real benefits under ten 
disability benefit programs in Canada as an identification strategy and data from the NLSCY as our data source, we 
find higher parental disability benefits indirectly protect child development and cognitive skill formation for children 
in families with low education. Specifically, the gaps in developmental outcomes between children of disabled parents 
and children of non-disabled parents grow wider in provinces that decrease their benefits compared to provinces that 
do not. In addition, the benefits have stronger effects on children's behaviour problems and emotional anxiety, than 
on children’s cognitive ability as measured by standardized math test scores. We interpret these estimates as causal 
effects of parental disability benefits, because a family's exposure to benefits affects the parents' income and 
employment, while it is independent of unmeasured characteristics.
Although parental disability is self-identified by parents through a checklist of questions, there is little evidence 
suggesting that the results are driven by reporting bias, screening stringency, sample composition change or 
unobserved family-level heterogeneity associated with parental disability. The additional robustness checks for 
correlated polices and inter-provincial migration response, including a “placebo” type of DD estimator for the less 
likely eligible (i.e. university educated) sample lend additional support to the main finding.
We also find that there is a difference in the benefit effect depending on the gender of the disabled parent: lower 
benefits have strong detrimental effects for children with a disabled mother, while the effects are small and 
insignificant for children with a disabled father. For families with a disabled mother, benefit reductions significantly 
increase the non-disabled father's full-time employment. Holding the father's employment status constant, estimated 
benefit effect drops moderately, suggesting that lower benefits may hurt children partially through the time constraints 
and stress associated with the non-disabled father’s longer employment. This finding is line with related Canadian 
studies that emphasize both parental time and money as important inputs to the well-being of children (Lethbridge 
and Phipps 2006; Burton, Lethbridge and Phipps 2008). A tight family budget directly limits the material resources 
that parents can afford for children (Mayer and Jencks 1993; Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997), but parents’ long hours 
of work can reduce the amount of time parents can spend with children, erode parental health, and increase stress 
levels, all of which negatively affect the well-being of children. A second explanation for the results is the "good 
mother hypothesis" that a mother's income is more likely than a father's income to be spent in ways that benefit 
children.
Since the mid-1990s, Canadian policy makers have made significant changes to welfare programs, in the general 
direction of connecting cash transfers to labour market participation. This paper’s findings suggest that reduced 
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income support to parents with disabilities may have had unintended adverse consequences for the well-being of their 
children. Governments in Canada continue to pay disability benefits that are now distinctly lower, in real terms, than 
twenty years ago. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the children who live in poor households
with disabled parents already face a gap in equality of opportunity due to their parent’s disability – and that outcome 
gap widens when disability benefits are cut.
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Table 2 Means for Independent Variables by Parental Disability Status.
Neither Parent Has a University Degree.
No Parent 
Disabled
At Least One 
Parent Disabled
Only Mother 
Disabled
Only Father 
Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child-level Characteristics
Child Age in Months 126 131 134 129
Child Female % 49.3 50.5 51.3 50.3
School Grade 4.9 5.3 5.5 5.1
Family-level Characteristics
Equivalent Family Income 
(2008 Constant Dollar)
$38,259 $36,431 $38,255 $35,679
Below LICO % 9.1 13.5 9.9 13.5
Either Parent Immigrant % 18.8 18.9 17.5 19.9
Mother Age in Years 38.1 38.8 38.8 38.8
Education of Mother Post-
Secondary Diploma %
29 30.2 29 32.8
Education of Mother High 
School Degree %
55.8 53.1 54.2 50.9
Education of Mother High 
School Dropout %
15.2 16.7 16.8 16.3
Mother Employment Status % 80.2 73.4 70.5 79.8
Mother Weekly Hours 27.4 24.6 23.4 27.6
Mother Weekly Hours 30 + % 56.5 50.1 47.8 57.4
Father Age in Years 40.2 41.6 41.2 41.8
Education of Father Post-
Secondary Diploma %
28.5 28.5 28 28.6
Education of Father High 
School Degree %
52 50.5 51.2 48.7
Education of Father High 
School Dropout %
19.5 21 20.8 22.7
Father Employment Status % 96.7 90.5 96.6 87.5
Father Weekly Hours 43.2 37.84 43.6 38.2
Father Weekly Hours 30 + % 94.5 87.3 95.2 83
Number of Observations 17,143 3,742 1,744 1,617
Note: The sample consists of non-disabled children aged between 4 and 15 in two-parent families whose parents were 
18 and 65 years of age and did not have any university degree. Children with two disabled parents (371 children) are 
excluded from the only-mother-disabled and only-father-disabled families. Descriptive statistics for this group of 
children are suppressed to avoid disclosure risks. Since the developmental stage for which an outcome measure was 
collected differs, children in this sample may have missing data on one or two of the dependent variables. Our analysis 
is conducted based on the largest sample possible for each outcome, so the sample size varies across models.
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Table 3 Children’s Developmental Outcomes and Family Income by Parental Disability
No Parent 
Disabled
At Least One Parent 
Disabled
Only Mother 
Disabled
Only Father 
Disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Disabled Children (Neither Parent has a University Degree)
Standardized Math 
Score
476
(108)
[11,454]
466**
(104)
[2,835]
467**
(106)
[1,276]
473
(105)
[1,244]
Hyperactive Symptoms 3.76
(2.98)
[11,846]
4.14***
(3.12)
[2,496]
4.20***
(3.21)
[1,112]
4.11***
(3.03)
[1,116]
Emotional Anxiety 2.17
(2.15)
[11,860]
2.54***
(2.23)
[2,491]
2.65***
(2.34)
[1,110]
2.46***
(2.16)
[1,116]
Non-Disabled Children (Full Sample)
Standardized Math 
Score
484
(114)
[17,112]
475**
(109)
[3,854]
474**
(109)
[1,724]
480
(112)
[1,717]
Hyperactive Symptoms 3.60
(2.91)
[17,111]
3.99***
(2.91)
[3,274]
3.98***
(3.15)
[1,485]
3.95***
(3.04)
[1,461]
Emotional Anxiety 2.15
(2.13)
[17,127]
2.50***
(2.23)
[3,269]
2.55***
(2.26)
[1,483]
2.45***
(2.23)
[1,461]
Note: The standardized math test scores are collected for children in grades two through ten. The hyperactive symptom 
and emotional anxiety are available for children aged four through eleven years old. The upper panel of the table is 
based on sub-samples drawn from the 20,885 children reported in Table 2 restricting to those with non-missing data 
on the outcome of interest. The lower panel of the table additionally includes children whose one or both parents has 
a university degree with all else held constant. Children both of whose parents are disabled are excluded from the 
only-mother-disabled and only-father-disabled families. Descriptive statistics for this group of children are suppressed 
in order to avoid possible residual disclosure. Number of observations and standard deviation are in square bracket 
and parentheses, respectively. The number of stars denotes the p-value of a t-test for group difference. *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
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Table 4 OLS Regressions of Child Outcomes on Family Income for Families
with and without a Parent with a Disability
Standardized Math Score Hyperactivity Symptoms Emotional Anxiety
Non-
Disabled
(1)
Disabled
(2)
Non-
Disabled
(1)
Disabled
(2)
Non-
Disabled
(1)
Disabled
(2)
Equivalent Family Income 
(2008 Constant Dollar) (log of)
2.301 13.554*** 0.014 0.295 -0.058 -0.070
(2.753) (4.351) (0.096) (0.181) (0.076) (0.130)
Child Age in Months 1.720
*** 1.817*** 0.028** 0.040 0.046*** 0.030
(0.416) (0.641) (0.013) (0.029) (0.010) (0.020)
Child Age Squared -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0001
** -0.0003** -0.0001*** -0.00008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.00007) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0001)
School Grade 19.129
*** 15.831*** -0.056 -0.039 -0.106 -0.145
(3.830) (3.607) (0.101) (0.151) (0.068) (0.105)
Child Female -2.030 -7.184
* -1.042*** -1.168*** 0.070 0.142
(2.539) (3.732) (0.0931) (0.181) (0.067) (0.140)
Either Parent Immigrant 4.451 2.856 -0.129 -0.556
* 0.0815 -0.290
(4.241) (6.332) (0.145) (0.320) (0.116) (0.181)
Mother Diploma 19.016
*** 12.293* -0.366** -0.027 -0.034 0.133
(4.001) (6.548) (0.170) (0.296) (0.134) (0.204)
Father Diploma 7.935
** 5.917 -0.059 -0.036 0.0690 0.387**
(3.893) (5.858) (0.138) (0.304) (0.113) (0.195)
Mother High School 12.768
*** 11.926** -0.393*** 0.192 -0.206* 0.262
(3.659) (5.883) (0.146) (0.284) (0.118) (0.183)
Father High School 4.752 7.393 -0.125 -0.133 0.0119 0.269(3.226) (5.157) (0.120) (0.273) (0.102) (0.173)
Mother Age in Years 2.521 -0.5148 -0.054 -0.191 -0.081 -0.225
**
(3.157) (3.800) (0.116) (0.170) (0.072) (0.111)
Mother Age Squared -0.0229 0.025 0.0004 0.002 0.0007 0.003
*
(0.040) (0.048) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0009) (0.001)
Father Age in Years -0.166 -0.187 -0.099 0.004 0.007 0.107(2.454) (3.005) (0.091) (0.139) (0.061) (0.080)
Father Age Squared 0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.00002 -0.0003 -0.001(0.029) (0.033) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.0009)
N 11,454 2,835 11,846 2,496 11,860 2,491
Adjusted 0.650 0.650 0.059 0.096 0.034 0.033
Notes: This table reports results from separate child outcome equations for children of non-disabled (column (1)) and 
disabled (column (2)) parents in our estimation sample, including family income for descriptive purposes. Province 
and year fixed effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
household level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 1 Disability Designations in Ten Disability Benefit Programs
Province/Disability 
Benefit Programs
Disability Designation
NL46 (Income Support 
Program)
A person who, because of a persistent and permanent physical, sensory, speech, 
communication, psychological, psychiatric, developmental or other disability, 
demonstrates significant challenges in accessing education, training, or employment.
PEI47 (Social Assistance 
Program)
A person in need “who has an ongoing intellectual, mental or physical impairment”.
NS48 (Employment 
Support and Income 
Assistance)
Refers to severe and persistent restriction or impairment that results in an inability to 
perform an activity in the range or within the range considered normal for someone 
of the same age, gender, and culture. It describes a functional limitation (versus a 
diagnosis) and is ongoing in nature.
NB 49(Social Assistance 
Program)
The Medical Advisory Board considers an individual for certification (of disability) 
who suffers from a major physiological, anatomical, or psychological impairment, 
which severely limits the individual in normal living activities, and which is likely to 
continue indefinitely without substantial improvement (i.e. totally and permanently 
disabled).
Quebec50 (Social 
Solidarity Program)
A person who, because of a persistent and permanent physical, sensory, speech, 
communication, psychological, psychiatric, developmental or other disability, 
demonstrates significant challenges in accessing education, training, or employment.
ON51 (Ontario Disability 
Support Program)
A person with a disability is defined as a person who has a substantial physical or 
mental impairment that is continuous or recurrent and is expected to last one year or 
more. The impairment must result in a substantial restriction in one or more activities 
of daily living (ability to attend to personal care, function in the community or 
function in a workplace), taking into account the person’s age, level of education and 
employment experience/work history.
MB52 (Employment and 
Income Assistance)
(A person who suffers from) physical or mental ill health, or physical or mental 
incapacity or disorder that is likely to continue more than 90 days is unable to earn 
income to meet basic necessities or unable to care for themselves.
SK53 (Saskatchewan 
Assistance Program)
Clients with a disability are those whose employment or training capabilities are 
limited and no change is expected within one year.
AB54 (Assured Income 
for the Severely 
Handicapped)
Applicants and clients must have a severe handicap that substantially limits their 
ability to earn a living; and is likely to remain permanent. There is no training, 
medical treatment or therapy that would improve the person’s ability to earn a living.
BC55 (BC Employment 
and Assistance Program)
Refers to cases which include a person 18 years of age or over with a severe mental 
or physical impairment, which restricts the person`s ability to perform daily living 
activities. The person must require an assistive device, the help or supervision of 
another person, or the services of an assistance animal to perform daily living 
activities.
46 NL: Income and Employment Support Regulations. www.hrle.gov.nl.ca/hrle
47 PEI: Social Assistance Policy Manual http://www.gov.pe.ca/sss/index.php3?number=1028464&lang=E
48 NS: http://www.gov.ns.ca/coms/disabilities/documents/GlossaryofTerms.html
49 NB: Social Assistance Policy Manual. http://www.gnb.ca/0017/Policy%20Manual/POL-E/policy1.htm#blind
50 Quebec: Individual and Family Assistance Act. http://www.mess.gouv.qc.ca/solidarite-sociale/programmes-
mesures/assistance-emploi/index_en.asp
51 Ontario: Income Support Directives. 
http://www.mcss.gov.on.ca/en/mcss/programs/social/directives/ODSP_incomesupport.aspx
52 MB: Income Assistance for Persons with Disabilities. http://www.gov.mb.ca/fs/pwd/iapd.html#content
53 SK: SAP Policy Manual. http://www.socialservices.gov.sk.ca/SAP-policy-manual.pdf. In addition, a separate 
disability support program, Saskatchewan Assured Income for Disability (SAID) was initiated since 2009
54 AB:  AISH Policy Manual. 
http://www.seniors.alberta.ca/aish/PolicyManual/Policy/Eligibility/Eligibility_Criteria.htm
55 BC: Persons with disabilities. http://www.hsd.gov.bc.ca/factsheets/2004/pwd.htm
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Appendix Table 2 Number of Recipients, Cases and Disability Benefit Level 
(Ontario Disability Support Program)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Number of Recipients 268,100 271,600 275,700 287800 315,700
Number of Cases 189,100 192,300 197,500 208100 228,900
Benefit Level (2008 Constant Dollars) 14,101 13,299 12,693 12,497 12,382
Note: The number of recipients and cases for Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) are collected from Social 
Assistance Statistics Report (2008) and Welfare Incomes (1999-2008), respectively. All benefits are converted into 
2008 dollars using provincial seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index (2011basket content) from Statistics Canada's 
CANSIM (database) Table 326-0021: http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/home-accueil?lang=eng, accessed 4 April, 
2014.
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Appendix Table 3 Associations between Parental Disability and Child Outcomes by Functional Domains
Limited at: 
Home
Limited at: 
Caring for 
Children
Limited at: 
Work/School
Limited at: 
Transportation/Leisure/Other N 
Math Score -7.383*** -8.988*** -7.429*** -3.423 14,289(2.637) (3.257) (2.832) (2.516)
Hyperactivity 
Symptoms
0.439*** 0.368* 0.318** 0.534*** 14,342(0.133) (0.197) (0.123) (0.120)
Emotional 
Anxiety
0.298*** 0.337*** 0.257 0.375*** 14,351(0.091) (0.121) (0.093) (0.090)
Note: The sample consists of non-disabled children aged between 4 and 15 years in two-parent families whose parents 
were 18 and 65 years of age and did not have any university degree. Estimates reported in this table are the coefficient 
of parental disability from a regression of each outcome measure on parental disability, the child's gender, age and 
age squared, grade, and year fixed effects. These estimates thus represent gender- and age-adjusted differences in child 
outcomes associated with parental disability. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the household 
level. * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.
